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News and Views 
Freedom of Information and Healthcare Data — 
Th e First UK Appeal: Common Services Agency v 
the Scottish Information Commissioner
Renate Gertz1
Research Fellow, Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), Research Centre for 
Studies in Intellectual Property and Technology Law, School of Law, University of Edinburgh
Abstract
 On the 1st of December 2006, the Court of Session in Edinburgh issued the ﬁ rst decision on Freedom 
of Information and health data regarding a request for information on incidences of childhood leukemia, 
in the range of 0 - 14 years, by year and census ward from 1990 to 2003 for the Dumfries and Galloway 
postal areas. Th e case, which provides an example for the collision course between the Freedom of Infor-
mation and Data Protection regime, had been anticipated as a landmark decision, however, due to several 
problems and inconsistencies it sadly failed to meet those expectations. 
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 I. Introduction 
 On 1 January 2005, the UK received its freedom of information legislation, in 
the form of the Freedom of Information Act in England and Wales and the Free-
dom of Information (Scotland) Act in Scotland. Both Acts are broadly similar in 
most respects. Th e Acts provide for a general right of access to information held 
by public authorities, however, subject to a number of exemptions, ranging from 
personal data to commercial interest. Th e personal data exemption is of particular 
interest, as the Acts refer to the Data Protection Act 1998 for a deﬁnition. Th us, 
two diametrically opposite statutes — one promoting a culture of caution and 
non-disclosure and the other one a culture of openness and disclosure — are 
linked, or, so it could be argued, on a collision course.2 Th is paper will analyse the 
1)  Acknowledgement: Th e author would like to thank Professor G T Laurie and Dr R Muir for their 
advice. Any mistakes, of course, are the author’s own 
2)  Laurie, G and Gertz, R., “When Worlds Collide: What are the obligations of the NHS at the interface 
between data protection and freedom of information regimes?” Edinburgh Law Review 2006 10:151-155 
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ﬁrst Scottish court decision on a freedom of information/data protection ques-
tion. While the decision was passed by a Scottish court, the underlying issues 
have a considerably wider signiﬁcance relating to the deﬁnition of what data the 
authority holds, personal data and medical research. 
 On 11 January 2005, the Common Services Agency for the Scottish Health 
Service (hereinafter ‘the CSA’) received a request from Mr Michael Collie on 
behalf of Chris Ballance, a member of the Scottish Parliament, under the Free-
dom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (hereinafter ‘FOISA’) for information 
on incidences of childhood leukaemia, in the range of 0-14 years, by year and 
census ward from 1990 to 2003 for the Dumfries and Galloway postal areas. Th e 
CSA refused the request as, in its opinion, (i) the combination of the rare diagno-
sis, speciﬁed age group, small geographical area and low numbers led to individu-
als being identiﬁable and therefore falling within the deﬁnition of ‘personal data’ 
under the Data Protection Act 1998 (hereinafter ‘DPA’) — ‘personal data’ being 
an exempt category of information under FOISA; (ii) having never carried out 
the analysis of the data by census ward the CSA did not hold the data requested; 
and (iii) the CSA had a duty of conﬁdence equivalent to that of the clinicians to 
whom the information were originally disclosed. Th e applicant did not respond 
to invitations to discuss accepting alternative data. After requesting that the CSA 
review its decision and receiving the same response he then turned to the Scottish 
Information Commissioner (hereinafter ‘the SIC’) for a ruling.3 
 While accepting that the requested data constituted personal data, the SIC 
ruled that a perturbed, ‘Barnardised’ version of the requested table, should be 
provided in an attempt to maintain anonymity. Barnardisation is a mechanism 
applied to tables with ﬁgures no greater than 4, whereby the numbers are changed 
by adding 0, +1 or −1. Cells containing 0, however, remain unchanged and cells 
containing 1 cannot be changed down to a 0. Th us, the SIC held that the CSA 
was in breach of FOISA for not having provided suﬃcient advice and assistance 
as to what information it was able to supply as required under section 15 of the 
Act. Th e CSA appealed this decision, which led to the ﬁrst UK court decision on 
Freedom of Information and health data in November 2006, when the case was 
heard before the Court of Session in Edinburgh. Th e Court refused the appeal 
and issued its opinion on the 1st of December. 
 II. Th e Judgment of the Edinburgh Court of Session 
 In its opinion, the Court of Session discussed two main issues. 
 First, the Court discussed the question whether Barnardised data can be con-
sidered as ‘held’ by the CSA and thus are the raw data presented in a particular 
form, or whether they are diﬀerent data which the CSA was not obliged to oﬀer 
3)  For an initial discussion of the case, see Laurie G and Gertz R., ibid. 
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Mr Collie. While the CSA submitted that the Barnardisation involved the cre-
ation of something new, the SIC claimed that Barnardisation simply allowed the 
original data to be presented in a diﬀerent form to protect conﬁdentiality and 
that the mechanism was intended not to change but rather to alter the focus 
of the data. Th e Court began by concurring that the raw data would allow 
identiﬁcation in which ward a child was diagnosed as having leukaemia in any 
year. Following from that, the Court elaborated that there are several ways in 
which these data can be treated to conceal the actual numbers, one such way 
being a table containing Y (for yes) and N (for no) in the appropriate cells, show-
ing whether there had been any diagnoses in this year and ward, thus shifting 
focus from incidents to incidences of leukaemia. Th is method was not seen to cre-
ate information diﬀering from the raw data. Th e same was deemed true for Bar-
nardisation with the Court focusing on the fact that while at ﬁrst sight, a material 
change seems to take place, “the intelligent reader will also be informed by a rela-
tive footnote that the numbers which he or she sees have been Barnardised and so 
cannot be regarded as true numbers”.4 Th e Court considered Barnardisation to 
leave the recipient of the table in the same position as in the case of the Y and N 
table, thus not providing diﬀerent information. Th is, so the Court asserts, results 
in Barnardised data being diﬀerent from the raw data only in presentation, not in 
kind and thus being data held by the CSA. 
 Second, the question whether the Barnardised data fell under the personal data 
exemption in section 38 of the FOISA in connection with the DPA was exam-
ined.5 Th e CSA submitted that this was the case, while the SIC, referring to the 
Durant case,6 where a narrow interpretation of personal data was chosen — data 
‘which relate to’7 an individual needed to have that data subject as their focus and 
had to be of biographical signiﬁcance, denied this suggestion. Rather, according 
to the SIC, neither did the Barnardised data have individuals as their main focus, 
nor were they of biographical signiﬁcance to the children in question. Biographi-
cal signiﬁcance in this connection means that mere incidental references are not 
suﬃcient. As in the ﬁrst issue, the Court agreed with the submissions of the SIC, 
stating that the focus had moved away from individual children to the more gen-
eral incidence of disease in particular wards in particular years. 
4)  First Division, Inner House, Court of Session [2006] CSIH 58 XA89/05, Opinion of the Lord Presi-
dent in Appeal by the Common Services Agency against the Scottish Information Commissioner, p. 8 
5)  S 1 (1) of the DPA: “personal data” means data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identiﬁed-
  (a) from those data, or 
  (b)  from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the 
possession of, the data controller, 
and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the 
data controller or any other person in respect of the individual 
6)  Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746; [2004] FSR 28 
7)  Data Protection Act 1998, s. 1 (1) 
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 A third issue, namely the question of the extent of the SIC’s powers to require 
the CSA to provide the Barnardised data, was not discussed as, according to the 
Lord President, it had been established that the data was held by the CSA. 
 III. Th e Implications of the Decision 
 Since the appeal was refused, both the decision made by the SIC and the princi-
ples established by the Court’s reasoning will need to be examined for their poten-
tially far-reaching implications for the CSA and the NHS more generally. 
 1. Diﬀerent or Not Diﬀerent — Th at is the Question 
 One important question for future requests and also for potential research is how 
useful Barnardisation actually is as a means to remove oneself from the scope of the 
DPA. If, as the Court elaborates, Barnardised data no longer constitute personal 
data, then any data thus processed would no longer fall within the auspices of the 
DPA. Th is, however, leads to an important problem raised by the Court’s opinion, 
namely an apparent inconsistency occurring between the two main issues. 
 Th us, on one hand, the Court stipulates that Barnardised data are no diﬀerent 
from the original raw data, only presented diﬀerently. However, the Court then 
proceeds to explain that while the original raw data must be considered personal 
data, thus falling under the s 38 exemption, the Barnardised data are not, as their 
focus has shifted. Th is, however, seems to constitute an inconsistency in the 
Court’s reasoning: If Barnardised data are no diﬀerent from the raw data, then 
how can the raw data be classiﬁed as personal data, while the Barnardised data do 
not fall into that category? Th e only possible way for this to be consistent is if we 
assume that the shift in focus away from individuals is caused by the diﬀerent 
presentation. Th is, however, seems highly unlikely, in particular when one con-
siders the far-reaching consequences this shift in focus has for the personal data 
question and the statement by the Court that the diﬀerent presentation does not 
result in diﬀerent data. 
 Th is seemingly unsolvable problem suggests that Barnardisation cannot be 
considered a useful tool to remove oneself from the scope of the DPA. In fact, 
Barnardisation is only one of a range of Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) 
measures available to data controllers. Moreover, it is not suitable for very sparse 
data tables, a fact which is consistent with guidance that emerged from the Oﬃce 
of National Statistics in October 2006. Additionally, one needs to consider the 
Court’s statement that “the intelligent reader will also be informed by a relative 
footnote that the numbers which he or she sees have been Barnardised and so 
cannot be regarded as true numbers”.8 Th e intelligent reader, in fact, knowing 
8)  First Division, Inner House, Court of Session [2006] CSIH 58 XA89/05, Opinion of the Lord Presi-
dent in Appeal by the Common Services Agency against the Scottish Information Commissioner, p. 8 
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that the numbers are small and having read the SIC’s decision, which spells out 
in detail the Barnardisation method that the CSA have to use in this case, may 
well be quite able to derive what the actual raw data was. 
 2. A Costly Analysis 
 A second and more practice-oriented problem that can be deduced from the 
Court’s opinion is raised by the ‘data held’ argument, which in eﬀect states that if 
a public authority holds raw data, it automatically holds these data in any imagin-
able analysed form, as long as the costs for the analysis do not exceed £ 600. 
Looking at the worst-case scenario, this results in the situation where a public 
authority may receive numerous requests for the same data in a variety of analysed 
forms. First, the authority may not have intended for those data to be analysed in 
that particular way (e.g. producing tables of disclosive data that threaten the pri-
vacy of individuals) and, second, while each individual request may fall well 
beyond the £ 600 benchmark, the summarised costs for the analyses of the data 
may exceed the budget. 
 3. Disclosive but Not Personal? 
 A third problem is the question of whether data can be disclosive without falling 
into the category ‘personal data’ and, if yes, how these data are to be treated and 
whether this constitutes a gap in the legislation, i.e. ‘personal data’ are covered, 
but not ‘disclosive data’. Disclosive data in this connection would mean data that, 
while not falling under the deﬁnition provided by s 1 (1) of the DPA, still allow 
conclusions to be drawn to the identity of the data subjects. Th e SIC referred to 
the Washington State Department of Health guidelines on working with small 
numbers. Th ere, it says that “a count of no events in the cell is clearly no threat to 
conﬁdentiality”.9 Furthermore, the SIC states in his decision “. . some or many 
of those cells will contain zero. Th is does not contain personal information 
and so that information should have been provided . .” It is obvious, however, 
that a request for a listing of all postcodes in Scotland where there have been no 
incidences of a condition is eﬀectively a request for a listing of the postcodes in 
which cases have been found. As some postcodes have only one or very few resi-
dents, the implications for privacy are obvious. In other words, zero cells are 
clearly disclosive of, at the very least, incidences of the disease. 
 Th e question this raises is whether these zero cells will have to be classiﬁed as 
personal data in this situation or whether disclosive data of this nature truly con-
stitute a gap in the legislation. 
 Hence, it will ﬁrst need to be determined whether a hypothetical request for all 
postcodes with no occurrence of the disease might fall under s 1 (1) of the DPA. 
9)  <http://www.doh.wa.gov/Data/Guidelines/SmallNumbers.htm> 
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 Individuals will obviously not be identiﬁable from the table containing zero 
cells alone, hence this table cannot be classiﬁed as personal data under s 1 (1) (a). 
It is worth examining, however, whether from the zero cells, together with other 
information to which the data controller may have access, individuals diagnosed 
with the rare disease may be identiﬁable according to s 1 (1) (b). 
 As mentioned above, the leading case in the UK up to now has been the well-
known decision the House of Lords reached in Durant,10 which limited the 
deﬁnition of personal data considerably through the introduction of the concepts 
of ‘biographical signiﬁcance’ of the data and that the putative data subject is the 
‘focus’ of the data to the law. Since then, Durant has been conﬁrmed in two other 
cases. Accordingly, the data must have the data subject as its focus and be of bio-
graphical detail. Taking the hypothetical case where the applicant requests only 
zero cells, i.e. postcodes where no disease has occurred, the focus of the request 
must be considered to rest on those post codes without occurrences of the diag-
nosed illness. Th e remaining few post codes had not been subject of the enquiry. 
Hence the individuals diagnosed with the disease would not be the focus of the 
data requested. Nor, obviously, would the requested postcodes be of any bio-
graphical signiﬁcance. 
 However, s 1 (b) of the DPA adds another possibility and focuses on whether 
the data controller has additional information in his/her possession, which, when 
linked with the information requested, will lead to the data subjects being 
identiﬁable. Th en the data will fall under the ‘personal data’ category. Th is, how-
ever, raises the question who in this case the data subject is. According to the 
DPA, “ ‘data subject’ means an individual who is the subject of personal data”. In 
our hypothetical case, however, the applicant had not requested postcodes where 
individuals had been diagnosed with the rare disease. Rather, the applicant asked 
for postcodes where none such individuals live. Can we, then, still speak of the 
diseased individuals as data subjects? Th e answer can only be negative. Even if we 
do not apply Durant and accept a broad interpretation of ‘personal data’, the need 
for a data subject has never been contested. In this hypothetical case, the request 
was not for information about individuals — identiﬁable or not — but rather 
for the opposite. Th is allows the conclusion to be drawn that the data in question 
do not fall under ‘personal data’ but are still disclosive if combined with other 
information. 
 IV. Conclusion 
 Th e Court’s decision in the Collie case had been anticipated as a landmark deci-
sion for Freedom of Information with regard to health data. Legal scholars had 
10)  Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 
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expected some clariﬁcation on the issues at stake. Rather, while hailed in the press 
as a victory for openness and accountability over a culture of secrecy, the prob-
lems and inconsistencies listed above demonstrate how this decision has sadly 
failed to meet those expectations. Instead, there are severe implications for the 
medical profession with regard to patient privacy: It appears that although data 
controllers in healthcare may be correct in stating that the data they are asked or 
ordered to release are potentially disclosive (and therefore a threat to patient pri-
vacy), nonetheless the information has to be given. If this decision has to be fol-
lowed, it needs to be clearly signalled to the General Medical Council as they are 
responsible for ensuring that doctors comply with ethical guidance that obliges 
them to protect patient information given in conﬁdence; to the UK Information 
Commissioner as it alters perceptions of what constitutes personal data; and to 
patients who may have concerns that the ability of NHS data controllers to pre-
vent release of potentially disclosive data has been signiﬁcantly weakened. 
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